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LEGISLATIVE NOTE
RICO FORFEITURE: CAN THE ADVERSARY BE
REMOVED FROM THE ADVERSARY PROCESS?
INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years ago, Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO).' Congress intended for the Act to provide
law enforcement agencies with strong legal tools to combat organized crime.
In enacting RICO, Congress recognized that the continued existence of
organized crime is primarily due to the large economic base underlying the
criminal organization. Congress included forfeiture provisions in the RICO
statute to remove that economic base. 2
A Government Accounting Office Report,' presented to Congress in 1981,
concluded that in the ten years since RICO's enactment, law enforcement
agencies' use of the act's forfeiture provisions had fallen far below Congress's
original expectations. The report attributed the shortfall to the statute's
ambiguities, 4 judicially imposed limitations,' and lack of enforcement. 6 As
a result of this report, Congress passed the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act
of 1984 (the Act).' In passing this act, Congress intended to correct the prior
statute's deficiencies and again provide an effective forfeiture remedy. The
Act makes substantial changes to the RICO forfeiture provisions and sig-
nificantly increases the attractiveness of the forfeiture remedy to federal law
enforcement agencies
The enactment of these amendments has increased forfeiture activity by
all federal law enforcement agencies. In addition to the overall increase in
forfeiture activity, law enforcement agencies have also attempted to utilize
this statute to reach the property transferred by RICO defendants to their
legal counsel in payment for services rendered.9 These potential forfeiture
actions directed toward RICO defendants' legal counsel present important
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970).
2. See infra notes 48-67 and accompanying text.
3. REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ASSET FORFEITURE: A
SELDOM USED ToOL IN COMBATTING DRUG TRAFFICKING 9 (1981) [hereinafter cited as REPORT
OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL].
4. Id. at 30. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
5. Id. at 18. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
6. Id. at 16. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
7. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). See infra notes 67-97 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 75-97 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 98-114 and accompanying text.
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questions concerning a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel, 10 the
attorney-client privilege,II an attorney's obligations under the rules of profes-
sional responsibility, 2 and the balance of power between the competing sides
in the adversary process. 3
The purpose of this Comment is threefold: first, to trace the development
of the RICO forfeiture provisions; second, to discuss the substantive changes
made to the RICO statute by the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984;
and finally, to analyze the court decisions that have considered the application
of the RICO forfeiture provisions to attorneys' fees, and to suggest appro-
priate legislative revisions to the RICO forfeiture provisions. 4
I. BACKGROUND
A. Forfeiture Statutes in Federal Law
Currently, two types of federal statutes may be utilized to forfeit crime-
related property: in rem and in personam statutes. The majority of federal
forfeiture statutes provide for civil in rem forfeiture proceedings against the
property itself. 5 Nevertheless, some federal statutes provide for in personam
10. See infra notes 115-29 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text. The applicability of the RICO forfeiture
provisions to attorneys' fees paid by RICO defendants has been a subject of much discussion.
See, e.g., Buffone, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees and the Effect of the Crime Control Act of
1984, DRuO L. REPORT 145 (1985) (forfeiture provisions may leave defendants without lawyer
of their choice and without funds to prepare defense, as well as eroding basic trust which is
cornerstone of attorney-client relationship); DePetris & Bachrach, Forfeiture of Attorneys'
Fees-A Responsible Approach, N.Y.L.J., June 19, 1985, at 1, col. 3 (suggesting procedures
to be followed in order to achieve proper balance between competing interests of government
and defendant); Margolin, Forfeiture of Attorney Fees and the Future of the Criminal Defense
Bar, THE CHAMPION, June 1985, at 10 (application of forfeiture provisions to defense attorneys
discourages handling of criminal defenses); Moffitt, The Twilight of the Attorney-Client
Privilege, THE CHAMPION, October 1985, at 15 (providing hypothetical picture of future of
small law firm faced with client seeking representation against RICO prosecution); Morvillo,
Freezing and Squeezing Lawyers, N.Y.L.J., April 2, 1985, at 1, col. I (discussing recent steps
taken against defense attorneys by prosecutors, as well as potential effect of forfeiture and
other legislation on defense bar); Robinson, Targeting Lawyers, New Assault by Prosecutors
on Attorney-Client Privilege, Fee Arrangements, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 21, 1985, at 1, col. 2
(discussing forfeiture provisions of Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984).
15. Examples of statutes providing for in rem forfeiture proceedings are 18 U.S.C. § 1082
(1982) (ships used for illegal gambling purposes); id. § 1465 (items used in transportation of
obscene materials for sale or distribution); id. § 3612 (illegal bribe money); id. § 3615 (illegal
liquor and any vehicle used in transportation thereof); 19 U.S.C. § 1497 (1982) (failure to
declare at entry); id. § 1594 (libel of vessels and vehicles); id. § 1595(a) (seizure for unlawful
importation); 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1) (1982) (adulterated food); id. § 881 (assets used in drug
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forfeiture through a criminal proceeding directly against the offending in-
dividual. This latter type imposes forfeiture as a criminal sanction in addition
to other sanctions that may be imposed upon the defendant.16
1. In Rem Forfeiture Proceedings
In rem forfeiture proceedings are well recognized in this country. 7 Virtually
any property used in a criminal offense may be subjected to an in rem
forfeiture proceeding. "' The constitutionality of in rem forfeiture proceedings
has been challenged on a number of occasions. The most common challenge
is that in rem proceedings violate the due process clause of the United States
Constitution. 9 The due process challenges are based on the theory that the
owner of the property is innocent, but is nonetheless being deprived of the
enjoyment of his property. 20 Courts have, however, consistently upheld the
use of in rem forfeiture proceedings on the theory that the proceeding against
the property stands independent of any action against its owner.2 The courts
violations, such as boats, cars, and manufacturing equipment); 26 U.S.C. § 5615 (1982) (distilling
apparatus); id. § 5661 (illegal wine); id. § 5872 (illegal firearms); id. § 5671 (illegal beer); id.
§§ 7301-7303 (property subject to internal revenue laws); 46 U.S.C. § 325 (1982) (vessels
regulations); 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1982) (any vessel, vehicle or aircraft used in transportation of
illegal contraband). See also Comment, RICO Forfeitures and the Rights of Innocent Third
Parties, 18 CAL. W.L. REV. 345, 349 (1982) (discussing third party rights in in rem forfeiture
proceeding) [hereinafter cited as Comment, RICO Forfeiture]; Note, Criminal Forfeiture and
the Necessity for a Post-Seizure Hearing: Are CCE and RICO Rackets for the Government?,
57 ST. JoiN's L. REv. 776, 783 (1983) (early forfeiture statutes as well as most of their modern
counterparts provide for civil in rem proceedings against offending property) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Criminal Forfeiture].
16. See, e.g., 18. U.S.C. § 1963 (1984) (proceeds of RICO activity); 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1984)
(proceeds of continuing criminal enterprise).
17. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921) (in rem forfeiture
proceedings are firmly fixed in punitive and remedial jurisprudence of this country).
18. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974) (contemporary
federal and state forfeiture statutes reach virtually any type of property that might be used in
conduct of criminal enterprise). See also United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 140-41
(N.D. Ga. 1979) (no constitutional or statutory barrier to forfeiture of property utilized to
violate criminal law).
19. The fifth amendment states, "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law . . . " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680 (1974); Goldsmith-
Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 509 (1921); United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43
U.S. (2 How.) 210, 219 (1844). The Supreme Court recently addressed the question of when a
forfeiture proceeding must be commenced by the government. The Court held that an eighteen-
month delay between the government seizure of currency and the filing of a forfeiture action
did not violate the defendant's due process right. See United States v. Eight Thousand Eight
Hundred and Fifty Dollars, 461 U.S. 555 (1983).
21. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683-84 (1974); Dobbins
Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1877); United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43
U.S. (2 How.) 210, 237 (844); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1, 14-15 (1827). In the
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have almost uniformly rejected the innocence of the owner as a defense. 22
A party who has no legal basis for relief, however, may petition the Attorney
General for equitable relief in the form of mitigation or remission of the
forfeiture. 23
2. In Personam Forfeiture Proceedings
An in personam forfeiture proceeding differs from an in rem proceeding,
in that the in personam action is against the owner of the property, rather
than the property itself.24 The widespread use of in personam forfeiture is a
recent development in federal law, resulting from Congress's enactment of
in personam forfeiture provisions in both the RICO statutez  and the Con-
tinuing Criminal Enterprise statute2 6 in 1970. While the widespread use of
in personam forfeiture may be recent, the concept of such forfeiture is rooted
in English common law.
Under the common law of England, a conviction for a felony or treason
resulted in the complete forfeiture of all of the convicted person's real and
personal property.2 7 Convicted felons forfeited their chattels to the Crown
Palmyra case, Justice Story enunciated the rationale of this line of cases:
It is well known, that at the common law, in many cases of felonies, the party
forfeited his goods and chattels to the crown. The forfeiture did not, strictly
speaking, attach in rem; but it was a part, or at least a consequence, of the judgment
of conviction .... [Tihe [Crown's right to the goods and chattels] attached only
by the conviction of the offender .... But this doctrine never was applied to
seizures and forfeitures, created by statute, in rem, cognizable on the revenue side
of the exchequer. The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather
the offense is attached primarily to the thing; and this, whether the offense be
malum prohibitum, or malum in se .... [Tihe practice has been, and so this
[Clourt understand the law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent
of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam.
25 U.S. (12 Wheat) at 14.
22. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974); Dobbins
Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1877). The judiciary's hard line approach is
undoubtedly a continuation of the philosophy expressed by Justice Johnson in United States
v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398 (1814). In this early case, Justice Johnson
stated, "[Slevere laws are rendered necessary to enable the executive to carry into effect the
measure of policy adopted by the legislature." Id. at 405.
23. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1617, 1618 (1982). According to these sections, a party whose
property has been forfeited pursuant to the United States customs laws may petition the collector
of customs and the Secretary of the Treasury for the remission or mitigation of any penalties
imposed, including forfeiture.
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1984), as well as 21 U.S.C. § 3848(a)(1) & (2) (1984). The
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also include specific procedures to implement an in
personam forfeiture. See infra notes 53-55; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2), 31(e), 32(b)(2),
54(b)(5).
25. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1984).
26. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1984).
27. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974); United States
v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980); Weiner, Crime
Must Not Pay: RICO Criminal Forfeiture in Perspective, 1 N. Iu. L. REv. 225, 229 (1981).
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while their lands escheated to their lord. Convicted traitors forfeited all their
property, real and personal, to the Crown.2 These forfeitures were based
on the belief that a breach of the criminal law was an offense to the King's
peace. Accordingly, the offender was denied the right to own property. 29 In
addition, when convicted of treason or a felony, the defendant's "blood
was corrupted so that nothing could pass by inheritance through his line." 30
This complete divestiture of property was known as "forfeiture of estate."'"
While forfeiture practices varied substantially from colony to colony in
early America, forfeiture of estate generally found little favor.3 2 In 1787, the
founding fathers drafted the Constitution and banned the imposition of
forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood for treason.33 Three years later,
the first Congress abolished the use of forfeiture of estate for all convictions
and judgments.34 Despite this prohibition, Congress, in the Confiscation Act
of 1862, authorized the President to seize the property of those who had
joined the Confederacy in the Civil War. 5 The Supreme Court upheld that
Act's constitutionality, but limited forfeiture to the life estates of the Con-
federate sympathizers. By so doing, the Court recognized the validity of the
reversionary interests of these person's heirs.3 6
B. The Enactment of RICO
Acting at the behest of federal prosecutors, Congress enacted the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970 to aid law enforcement officials in their efforts
28. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 68-71 (3d ed. 1927); 1 F. POLLOCK
& F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 351 (2d ed. 1909).
29. See I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 299 (1771).
30. See generally 1 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 581-83 (1892); 2 KENT'S
COMMENTARIES ON AMeICAN LAW 385-87 (1836).
31. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 28, at 68-71; Note, Criminal Law-Forfeiture-Profits
Derived from Racketeering Activity are Forfeitable Interests Under 18 U.S.C. Section 1963, 14
ST. MARY'S L.J. 811, 812 n.10 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Criminal Law].
32. See generally 1 J. BISHOP, supra note 30, at 585-86; Note, Bane of American Forfeiture
Law-Banished at Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 768, 776-77 (1977).
33. U.S. CONST. art III, § 3, cl. 2 provides, "The Congress shall have Power to declare the
Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or
Forfeiture, except during the Life of the Person attained."
34. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 117, ch. 9, § 24 (1790) (recently codified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3563 (1986)). For judicial recognition of this legal history, see Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92
U.S. 202, 208-11 (1876).
35. Act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 589, ch. 195, § 5 (1862).
36. Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 308-9 (1870) (Confiscation Act of 1862
constitutional and not in conflict with fifth and sixth amendments); Bigelow v. Forrest, 76 U.S.
(9 Wall.) 339, 351 (1869) (by virtue of decree of condemnation and order of sale under
Confiscation Act of 1862, only right to property seized could be sold, terminating with life of
person for whose offense it had been seized).
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to eradicate organized crime in the United States.3 7 Title IX of this act
includes a chapter entitled "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions," 38 which sets forth four general types of prohibited criminal activity.
Section 1962(a)39 prohibits an individual from using illegitimately obtained
funds to acquire a legitimate enterprise, by prohibiting any person from
using either income, or the proceeds of income, derived directly or indirectly4°
from racketeering activity or illegal debt collection to establish, operate, or
acquire an interest in an enterprise affecting interstate commerce.4' Section
1962(b), on the other hand, prohibits the acquisition of a legitimate enterprise
through the use of illegitimate means, other than the income or proceeds
attributable to those illegitimate means. 42 Under this section, no person can
use a pattern of racketeering or unlawful debt collection to acquire, maintain
an interest in, or control any enterprise affecting interstate commerce.43
37. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). In the Statement of Findings and Purpose of
the Act, Congress stated, "It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies
to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." Id. at 923.
38. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982) provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an
unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the
meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or
indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
40. In order to meet its burden of proof, the prosecution must only prove that illegally
derived funds entered the enterprise. The prosecution need not show a trail of specific dollars
from a particular criminal act. United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1342 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984). A similar conclusion was reached in United States v.
McNary, 620 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980), where the court held that § 1962(a) does not require
that the illicit income be used or invested in an enterprise affecting interstate commerce.
41. To satisfy the interstate element of § 1962(a), the enterprise, not the individual defendant,
must be shown to engage in or affect interstate commerce. United States v. Groff, 643 F.2d
396 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828 (1981). Likewise, the prosecution must show that the
enterprise, not the racketeering acts, affected interstate commerce. Only a slight nexus need be
shown, however, to establish the requisite effect on commerce. United States v. Long, 651 F.2d
239, 241-42 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1981). See also United States v. Rone, 598
F.2d 564, 573 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980) (government must show nexus,
albeit slight, between enterprise and interstate commerce); United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d
836 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978) (government must show at least slight
evidence that enterprise affected interstate commerce).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982) states, "It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern
of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce."
43. See supra note 41. Recently, in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3287
(1985), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576
19861 RICO FORFEITURE
Section 1962(c) is directed at those individuals who are employees or asso-
ciates of an illegitimate enterprise rather than at those attempting to gain
control of a legitimate enterprise."4 This section prohibits any person em-
ployed by or associated with an enterprise from conducting or participating
in the affairs of the enterprise in a manner that constitutes a pattern of
racketeering or illegal debt collection. 4 Finally, section 1962(d) makes con-
spiracy to violate sections 1962(a), (b), or (c) a separate offense. 4 6
C. RICO Forfeiture Provisions
The primary motivation for enacting RICO was to curtail the increasing
wealth and influence of organized crime 47 by attacking its economic base. 48
(1981), that § 1963(a) and § 1963(b) are not limited solely to legitimate business. In Turkette,
the Supreme Court held that § 1962(a) and § 1962(b) not only apply to infiltration by organized
crime of legitimate business, but they are also aimed at preventing racketeers from investing or
reinvesting in wholly illegal or illegitimate enterprises. Id. at 584.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982) provides, "It shall be unlawful for any person employed by
or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt."
45. In United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), the Supreme Court held that an
enterprise is not a pattern of racketeering activity, but is an entity separate and apart from the
activity in which it is engaged. In order to secure a conviction, the government must prove the
existence of an enterprise and the connected pattern of racketeering activity. Id. at 583. Prior
to the Supreme Court's decision in Turkette, the various circuits were in conflict over the scope
of a RICO enterprise, and whether illicit associations were also included. See Comment, An
Introductory Examination of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 15
AKRON L. REV. 771, 786-87 nn.137-52 (1982).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982) provides, "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire
to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section."
The issues surrounding the application of § 1962(d) are too complex and diverse to be
properly examined within the context of this Comment. For background reading, see Note,
Elliott v. United States: Conspiracy Law and the Judicial Pursuit of Organized Crime through
RICO, 65 VA. L. REv. 109 (1979). See also United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984) (conspiracy conviction under RICO requires proof of
enterprise and racketeering elements plus defendant's objective manifestation of intent to
participate in affairs of enterprise); United States v. Melton, 689 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1982) (to
be convicted of RICO conspiracy, there must be proof that individual objectively manifested
agreement to participate in affairs of enterprise, through commission of two or more of predicate
crimes).
47. Congress stated its concerns in the Statement of Findings and Purposes of the Act:
[O]rganized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and
widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy
by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption ...
[O]rganized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering
process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence
necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies
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After a RICO conviction, the statute provided for criminal in personam
forfeiture of any interest the defendants had acquired in the enterprise they
were charged with corrupting. The penalty of forfeiture was in addition to
more traditional punitive measures, such as fines and imprisonment.4 9 The
constitutionality of the RICO forfeiture provisions has been challenged on
the grounds that the forfeiture provisions are unconstitutionally vague,50 that
a RICO forfeiture constitutes an unconstitutional forfeiture of estate," and
that a RICO forfeiture results in cruel and unusual punishment under the
eighth amendment.5 2 Despite these challenges, the courts have consistently
upheld the constitutionality of the forfeiture provisions.
A RICO forfeiture action begins at the issuance of a grand jury indictment
alleging that the defendant has violated the statute,5" along with specifying
what property is subject to forfeiture. 4 If the defendant is found guilty of
available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
48. Senator McClellan, a sponsor of the RICO Act, stated:
[T]itle IX is aimed at removing organized crime from our legitimate organizations.
Experience has shown that it is insufficient to merely remove and imprison individual
mob members. Title IX attacks the problem by providing a means of wholesale
removal of organized crime from our organizations, prevention of their return and,
where possible, forfeiture of their ill-gotten gains.
116 CoNo. REC. 591 (1970). See also REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 3.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982) provides:
Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined not
more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall
forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he has acquired or maintained in
violation of section 1962, and (2) any interest in, security of, claim against, or
property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over, any
enterprise which he has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated
in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.
50. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp 134, 142 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (RICO forfeiture
provisions are clearly drafted and are not unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous). See also
United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393 (2d Cir. 1979) (court refused to reconsider its holding
that RICO is not unconstitutionally vague).
51. United States v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566, 577 (1lth Cir. 1985) (RICO forfeiture is for
exact amount of money which defendant illegally received in contravention of statute and
therefore is not cruel and unusual punishment); United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039
(4th Cir. 1980) (RICO forfeiture results in forfeiture of narrow interest of defendant); United
States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991 (5th Cir. 1977) (Congress recognized that in passing § 1963
it was repealing part of statute enacted by First Congress prohibiting forfeiture of estate);
United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 141 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (RICO forfeiture affects only
defendant's unlawfully maintained interest in enterprise and is thus not forfeiture of estate).
52. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d. Cir. 1979) (RICO forfeiture is not cruel
and unusual punishment because forfeiture provision is keyed to magnitude of defendant's
criminal enterprise and is thus proportional to crime); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp.
134, 141 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (RICO forfeiture is neither excessive nor disproportionate and does
not involve needless severity).
53. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
54. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that "when an offense charged may
[Vol. 35:709
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the RICO charges, the finder of fact must then return a special verdict listing
the property subject to forfeiture55 and authorizing the Attorney General to
seize such property. 6 The physical seizure of the defendant's property,
however, only occurs after a conviction.
Despite this relatively straightforward procedure, the application of the
statute has proven difficult. Consequently, the effectiveness of the forfeiture
provisions to law enforcement agencies has been diminished. For example,
while section 1963(a) provided for the forfeiture of "any proceeds" of the
defendant's criminal activities, 7 it was ambiguous whether this was limited
solely to direct proceeds,58 or whether it should be applied broadly to allow
the statute to reach both direct and derivative proceeds.19 It was not until
1983, in Russello v. United States,60 that the Supreme Court resolved this
issue by holding that both direct and derivative proceeds of a defendant's
criminal activities were subject to forfeiture under RICO. 6'
result in a criminal forfeiture, the indictment or information shall allege the extent of the
interest or property subject to forfeiture." FED R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2). In United States v. Hall,
521 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975), the court held that if the indictment does not contain a forfeiture
count, criminal forfeiture automatically ceases to be an available remedy. Id. at 408.
55. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure state, "If the indictment or the information
alleges that an interest or property is subject to criminal forfeiture, a special verdict shall be
returned as to the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any." FED. R.
CRIM. P. 31(e). See also Weiner, supra note 27, at 253 (once jury makes judgment of relationship
of property or interest to criminal violation, court cannot preempt jury's decision).
56. Section 32(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states, "When a verdict
contains a finding of property subject to a criminal forfeiture, the judgment of criminal forfeiture
shall authorize the Attorney General to seize the interest or property subject to forfeiture, fixing
such terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper." FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b).
57. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
58. United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276 (7th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 464
U.S. 979 (1983) (term "any interest" used in RICO's forfeiture provisions does not include
income, proceeds, or profits derived from pattern of racketeering activity); United States v.
Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980) (RICO forfeiture is limited to defendant's
interest in criminal enterprise and does not include amount paid or payable for performance
of contract procured through pattern of racketeering activity).
59. United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom.
Russello v. United States, 459 U.S. 1101 (1983) (term "interest," as used in RICO's forfeiture
provisions, includes income or profit derived from pattern of racketeering activity and is not
limited to interests in criminal enterprise). See generally Note, The Forfeiture of Profits under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: Enabling Courts to Realize RICO's
Potential, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 747 (1983). But see Note, Criminal Law, supra note 31, at 824
(RICO allows forfeiture of interests in enterprises, not profits derived from racketeering
activities; Martino court erroneously legislated forfeiture of profits into Act).
60. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
61. Id. at 22. In Russello, the petitioner had been convicted under RICO due to his
involvement in an arson ring that fraudulently received insurance proceeds in payment for the
fire loss of a building he owned. A judgment of forfeiture was also entered against the petitioner
for the amount of the insurance proceeds pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1). The petitioner
challenged this judgment of forfeiture on the grounds that these insurance proceeds were not
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A second major area of uncertainty under the original RICO forfeiture
statute centered upon the language in section 1963(b). This section authorized
the government to seek a pre-conviction restraining order to guard against
the improper disposition of the defendant's otherwise forfeitable assets. 62
While jurisdiction was conferred upon the court to entertain applications by
the government for such orders, the statute itself did not articulate the
procedural standards the court should follow. 63 Furthermore, section 1963(b)
failed to adequately protect the government's interest in assuring that the
proceeds of the defendant's criminal activities would be available for for-
feiture upon conviction. This inadequacy resulted because the section did
not provide the government with the authority to seek a pre-indictment
restraining order. Moreover, the section failed to provide for the forfeiture
of other assets of the defendants in the event that they successfully transferred
their forfeitable assets prior to being convicted. 64 A final problem with the
an interest in an enterprise within the meaning of § 1963(a)(1) and were therefore not subject
to forfeiture. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that § 1963(a)(1) reaches
more than only interests in an enterprise. In so holding, the Court noted that Congress did not
specifically define the term "interest" in the RICO statute, and that therefore the legislative
purpose in using this term must be expressed by the term's ordinary meaning, which comprehends
all forms of real and personal property, including profits and proceeds. Id.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1982). Prior to amendment, § 1963(b) provided that, "In any
action brought by the United States under this section, the district courts of the United States
shall have jurisdiction to enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or to take such other
actions, including but not limited to, the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds in
connection with any property or other interest subject to forfeiture under this section, as it
shall deem proper." Id.
63. In the absence of clear statutory direction, the courts were left to their own judgment
in determining the standards that should be applied in the issuance of a restraining order. The
court's discretion included whether a hearing was necessary, and if so, what type of showing
the government had to make in order to meet their burden of proof. See, e.g., United States
v. Scharf, 551 F.2d 1224, 1226 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977) (once indictment is
returned, restraining order may be issued without advisory hearing); United States v. Beckham,
562 F. Supp. 488 (D. Mich. 1983) (government must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that property it is seeking to forfeit is involved in RICO violation in order to obtain restraining
order); United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 241-42 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (in rem forfeiture
statutes wholly different from criminal forfeiture statutes and provide no procedural guidance);
United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 724-25 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (restraining order can be
issued upon showing that assets are allegedly subject to forfeiture and that defendant is
attempting to transfer property). See generally Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Pros-
ecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 295-304 (1980) (providing excellent discussion of
standards imposed by courts faced with government application for pre-conviction restraining
order under § 1963(b)).
64. This result was not permitted in United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981).
In Long, the court held that assets transferred by the defendant, prior to the entry of a
restraining order, would still be subject to forfeiture where there was evidence that the transfer
may have been fraudulent. See also United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 801 (7th Cir.
1985) (government's interest in forfeitable property vests at time of commission of criminal act
and cannot be defeated by defendant subsequently dissipating or transferring away forfeitable
property).
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RICO forfeiture statute was that it failed to protect the rights of third parties
who were affected by a forfeiture of the defendant's property. The statute
did not provide for adjudication of third parties' rights.65 Consequently,
these third parties were forced to petition the Attorney General for the
equitable relief of mitigation or remission of the forfeiture. 66
D. The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984
At the time of RICO's enactment, Congress envisioned forfeiture as a
major new law enforcement remedy directed against the financial resources
of organized crime.6 1 In 1981, Congress was presented with a report prepared
by the Government Accounting Office (GAO), which concluded that the use
of the RICO forfeiture provisions by federal law enforcement agencies was
falling far short of this goal.68 The GAO report emphasized that the forfeiture
65. See Note, Criminal Forfeiture, supra note 15, at 778-79 (RICO statute does not delineate
procedural method to be employed in effecting seizure under its forfeiture provisions); contra
Comment, RICO Forfeiture, supra note 15, at 349 (RICO forfeiture statute contains adequate
provisions to prevent unjust result where interests of third parties are affected by forfeiture
under statute).
66. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1982), all provisions of law relating to the remission or
mitigation of forfeitures under the customs laws are applicable to forfeitures incurred under
RICO. Under the customs laws of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1614, 1617 & 1618 (1982), property subject to
forfeiture may be redeemed, and the collector of customs and the Secretary of the Treasury
are given discretion to grant a remission or mitigation of the forfeiture. The duties that normally
fall upon the collector of customs or the Secretary of the Treasury are to be performed by the
Attorney General under the RICO statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1982). While the courts may
review the actions taken by those charged with power to grant remission or mitigation of a
forfeiture, the courts have very little control over the actions of these persons. United States
v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 811 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 615 F.2d 383 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 833 (1980).
67. The Report of the Comptroller General, states:
Although attacking the financial resources of criminal organizations through for-
feiture of their assets has been discussed for several years, little has been done.
Forfeitures to date have consisted primarily of the vehicles used to smuggle drugs
and the cash used in drug transactions. Compared to the profits realized, these
forfeitures have amounted to little more than incidental operating expenses. The
illicit profits themselves and the assets acquired with them have remained virtually
untouched.
When enacted more than a decade ago, the RICO and CCE statutes were
envisioned as a major new law enforcement remedy directed at the financial resources
of organized crime. For example, drug trafficking organizations were to be com-
pletely immobilized by not only jailing their key people, but also obtaining forfeiture
of their assets. Unfortunately, the potential effectiveness of forfeiture in combatting
drug trafficking cannot yet be assessed, because the key statutes authorizing for-
feiture have not received extensive use.
REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 3, at 9.
68. Id.
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provisions contained numerous ambiguities and limitations.69 In addition,
the report noted that law enforcement agencies were not aggressively pursuing
the forfeiture remedy. 70 Faced with this analysis, Congress held committee
hearings that resulted in a number of bills designed to improve the forfeiture
laws being introduced in both the House and Senate." This effort finally
came to fruition in the closing days of the 98th Congress. In October 1984,
Congress hurriedly passed the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 as Title
III of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.72
Congress passed the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act to enhance the use of
criminal forfeiture as a law enforcement tool in combating criminal racket-
69. The Report of the Comptroller General identified four specific problems with the prior
RICO forfeiture statute. First, the scope of the forfeiture authorizations had been narrowly
defined. Second, forfeiture under RICO had been limited by some courts to interests in legal
enterprises or had been construed so as not to include "profits." Third, the extent to which
assets had to be traced to the crime of conviction was unclear. Fourth, the transfer of assets
prior to conviction limited the effectiveness of forfeiture. See id. at 30. In addition, the report
noted that the procedures necessary to accomplish a forfeiture had not been clearly defined.
Id.
70. The Report of the Comptroller General stated:
Even though attacking drug trafficker's finances has been a major component of
the Government's drug law enforcement policy for several years, it has not been
effectively integrated into DEA or U.S. Attorney operations. The Department of
Justice has simply not exercised the kind of leadership and management necessary
to make asset forfeiture a widely used law enforcement technique. Nearly ten years
after the forfeiture statutes were enacted, the Department lacked the most rudi-
mentary information needed to manage the forfeiture effort. No one knew how
many forfeiture cases were attempted and why, the disposition of the cases, or why
those attempted either failed or succeeded.
Id. at 16. The Comptroller General further noted that the RICO and CCE forfeiture statutes
had only been applied in ninety-eight cases during the period from 1970 to March, 1980. Id.
at 10. See also Webb & Turow, RICO Forfeiture in Practice: A Prosecutorial Perspective, 52
U. CIN. L. REV. 404 (1983) (general discussion of problems faced by prosecutors in seeking
RICO forfeiture judgments).
71. In July, 1980, hearings were held to assess the effectiveness of the RICO and CCE
statutes. See Forfeiture of Narcotics Proceeds: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). As a result of these
hearings, a number of bills were introduced in Congress. See, e.g., S. 948, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983); S. 830, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 829, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R.
3963, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 7140, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982); S. 2572, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1982); S. 2320, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 1126, 97th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1981).
72. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp.
1332 (D. Colo. 1985) (legislative history). In Rogers, the court noted that there was little
legislative history interpreting the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 and that the Act
was so hastily passed that the copy to be executed by the President was missing pages. Further,
the Rogers court noted that even after enactment, the contents of the Act were so uncertain
that portions of the bill that were not enacted were included in the United States Code Annotated
advance sheets of the law. Id. at 1336 n.l.
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eering activity. 73 The Act made substantial changes to the forfeiture provi-
sions of RICO. A number of these changes were directed at administrative
matters necessary to the forfeiture process. 74 These administrative changes
were designed to provide guidance to both the courts and law enforcement
agencies. Congress also made substantive changes in areas where the prior
statute was ambiguous or had been limited by case law. Perhaps the most
significant of these changes were those clarifying when forfeiture is appro-
priate and the types of property subject to forfeiture.75 To reach these aims,
Congress explicitly provided in the 1984 Act that both direct and derivative
proceeds of the defendant's criminal activity were subject to the Act's
coverage.7 6 Next, Congress emphasized that the definition of property subject
73. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD.
NEWS 3182, 3375 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
74. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1963() (1984) (court has authority to order deposition of any
witness or production of any non-privileged material that will facilitate identification of for-
feitable property); id. § 1963(k) (court has power to enter forfeiture orders without regard to
location of property); id. § 1963(f) (following entry of forfeiture order, court may take any
action necessary to protect government's interest); id. § 1963(g) (Attorney General shall direct
disposition of forfeited property, but court may enter restraining order upon showing of
irreparable harm to third party); id. § 1963(h) (outlining Attorney General's powers with respect
to forfeited property); id. § 1963(i) (Attorney General has power to promulgate regulations);
id. § 1963(j) (third parties affected by forfeiture must avail themselves of ancillary hearing
procedure of § 1963(m) and cannot intervene in criminal case or initiate civil suit against
government).
75. Prior to amendment, § 1963(a) provided that the defendant shall forfeit (1) any interest
acquired or maintained in violation of § 1962, and (2) any interest in, security of, claim against,
or property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise
which the defendant had established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the
conduct of, in violation of § 1962. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (amended 1984). In § 1963(a), as
amended, Congress specifically used the term "proceeds" to describe the interest of the
defendant in the criminal enterprise that was subject to forfeiture. This term was chosen over
the term "profits" in order to alleviate what Congress perceived to be an unfair burden on the
government of proving net profits. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 199. See also United
States v. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1117 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 432 U.S.
137 (1977) (finding evidence of net profits is extremely difficult in this conspiratorial, criminal
area). Subsequent to the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act's revision of the RICO forfeiture
provisions, the Second Circuit interpreted the pre-amendment RICO forfeiture provisions as
requiring that forfeiture be based upon gross rather than net profits. See United States v. Lizza
Industries, Inc., 755 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1985).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1984). See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. At the time
the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 was passed, the Supreme Court had granted certiorari
in Russello v. United States, 459 U.S. 1101 (1983), to review the issue of whether RICO's
forfeiture provisions extended to both direct and derivative proceeds of a defendant's criminal
activity. Congress recognized the pending nature of this review, but included this provision in
the 1984 Act because of its perception that the interpretations, such as that in United States v.
McManigal, 708 F.2d 276 (7th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 464 U.S. 979 (1983), and United
States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980), finding that RICO's forfeiture
provisions reached only direct proceeds of the defendant's criminal activity, significantly di-
minished the utility of the RICO criminal forfeiture sanction and was at odds with the overall
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to forfeiture under RICO was to be broadly construed, by specifically
providing that all property, whether real, or tangible or intangible personal
property, was subject to forfeiture. 77 Finally, the 1984 amendments dem-
onstrate Congress's intent to make criminal forfeiture a mandatory penalty
for RICO convictions.7 8
A second major area addressed by the 1984 amendments was Congress's
perception that defendants could too easily defeat the prior RICO forfeiture
provisions by pre-conviction transfer of forfeitable assets. 79 The 1984 amend-
ments strengthened the government's forfeiture power in two ways. 0 First,
purpose of this statute. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 199. The Supreme Court's later
decision in Russello reached the same end that Congress had reached through this specific
revision of § 1963(a).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1984). This section provides, "Property subject to criminal
forfeiture under this section includes-(1) real property including things growing on, affixed
to, and found in land; and (2) tangible and intangible personal property, including rights,
privileges, interests, claims and securities." Id.
The enactment of this section underscores Congress's intent that positions, offices, and
employment contracts acquired or used in racketeering and the right to exercise or benefit from
such interests is consistent with the purpose of RICO forfeiture. See SENATE Report, supra
note 73, at 200. See also United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 439 U.S. 810 (1977) (defendant convicted on RICO and other charges arising
out of embezzlement of union and employee welfare benefit plans was ordered to forfeit his
various union and benefit plan offices).
78. Congress expressed its intent by amending § 1963(a) to provide that "whoever violates
any provision of section 1962 of this chapter ... shall forfeit to the United States .... " 18
U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1984) (emphasis added). This amendment brought the RICO statute into
accord with prior case law which held that forfeiture was mandatory upon conviction for a
RICO violation. See United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 959 (1983) (forfeiture is mandatory upon the jury's determination that the defendant has
violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962); United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 833 (1980) (forfeiture of property involved in violation of RICO is mandatory rather
than discretionary).
79. The Senate Judiciary Committee noted that:
Unlike civil forfeitures, in which the government's seizure of the asset occurs at or
soon after the commencement of the forfeiture action, in criminal forfeitures, the
assets generally remain in the custody of the defendant until the time of his
conviction for the offense upon which the forfeiture is based. Only after conviction
does the government seize the asset. Thus, a person who anticipates that some of
his property may be subject to criminal forfeiture has not only an obvious incentive,
but also ample opportunity, to transfer his assets or remove them from the juris-
diction of the court prior to trial and so shield them from any possibility of
forfeiture.
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 195.
80. The legislative history of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 indicates that
Congress also attempted to alleviate the problem of pre-conviction transfers of property by
RICO defendants by including a substitute assets provision in the Act. Had this substitute assets
provisions taken effect, it would have been set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d). The Senate
Judiciary Committee report, in reference to proposed § 1963(d), stated:
This subsection addresses one of the most serious impediments to significant criminal
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section 1963(e) was added to expand the government's pre-existing authority
to enter post-indictment restraining orders and to extend this authority, in
certain circumstances, to the entry of pre-indictment restraining orders.8
Section 1963(e) provides that a post-indictment restraining order can be
entered by the court without prior notice or a hearing, because the indictment
provides the defendant with sufficient notice that forfeiture will be sought.8 2
Section 1963(e) also significantly expands the court's power by providing for
the entry of pre-indictment restraining orders, either with 3 or without4
forfeitures. Presently, a defendant may succeed in avoiding the forfeiture sanction
simply by transferring his assets to another, placing them beyond the jurisdiction
of the court, or taking other actions to render his forfeitable property unavailable
at the time of conviction. Under this new provision, forfeiture of substitute assets
would be authorized when property found subject to forfeiture under section 1963(a),
as amended, (1) cannot be located; (2) has been transferred to, sold to, or deposited
with, a third party; (3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court; (4)
has been substantially diminished in value by any act or omission of the defendant;
or (5) has been commingled with other property that cannot be divided without
difficulty.
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 201-02. This provision, however, was subsequently
deleted by Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, §§ 302, 2301(b), 98 Stat. 2040-41, 2192 (1984). The
reason underlying the last minute deletion of what would have been § 1963(d) is unclear. United
States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 801 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e) (1984).
82. The Senate Judiciary Committee stated:
[Tlhe post-indictment restraining order provision does not require prior notice and
opportunity for a hearing. The indictment or information itself gives notice of the
government's intent to seek forfeiture of the property. Moreover, the necessity of
quickly obtaining a restraining order after indictment in the criminal forfeiture
context presents exigencies not present when restraining orders are sought in the
ordinary civil context. This provision does not exclude, however, the authority to
hold a hearing subsequent to the initial entry of the order and the court may at
that time modify the order or vacate an order that was clearly improper . . . . For
the purposes of issuing a restraining order, the probable cause established in the
indictment or information is to be determinative of any issue regarding the merits
of the government's case on which the forfeiture is based.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 203.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(l)(B) (1984). This section permits the court to enter a pre-indictment
restraining order if, after notice to persons appearing to have an interest in the property and
an opportunity for a hearing, the court determines that:
(i) there is a substantial probability that the United States will prevail on the issue
of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order will result in the property being
destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise made unavailable
for forfeiture; and (ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property through
the entry of the requested order outweighs the hardship on any party against whom
the order is to be entered.
Id.
84. 18 U.S.C § 1963(e)(2) (1984) provides:
A temporary restraining order under this subsection may be entered upon application
of the United States without notice or opportunity for a hearing when an information
or indictment has not yet been filed with respect to the property, if the United
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notice to parties appearing to have an interest in the property. 5 Congress's
second major amendment of the RICO forfeiture provisions, designed to
defeat the problem of pre-conviction transfer, was a codification of the
"taint" theory in section 1963(c).16 Under the taint theory, the interest of
the government in the defendant's property vests at the time of the com-
mission of the act giving rise to the forfeiture and is not extinguished by
pre-conviction transfers by the defendant to third parties. Congress also
States demonstrates that there is probable cause to believe that the property with
respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject
to forfeiture under this section and that provision of notice will jeopardize the
availability of the property for forfeiture. Such a temporary order shall expire not
more than ten days after the date on which it is entered, unless extended for good
cause shown or unless the party against whom it is entered consents to an extension
for a longer period. A hearing requested concerning an order entered under this
paragraph shall be held at the earliest possible time, and prior to the expiration of
the temporary order.
85. In the case of a post-indictment or pre-indictment restraining order, if a hearing is held,
§ 1963(e)(3), provides that, "[t]he court may receive and consider, at a hearing held pursuant
to this subsection, evidence and information that would be inadmissible under the Federal Rules
of Evidence." 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(3) (1984). See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332,
1345 (D.C. Colo. 1985) (due process does not require application of Federal Rules of Evidence
in all cases). But see United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 619 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982) (Federal
Rules of Evidence apply to adversary hearing for purpose of continuing restraining order under
§ 1963); United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 248-49 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Federal Rules of
Evidence apply to adversary hearing for purpose of continuing restraining order under 18
U.S.C. § 848).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1984). This section provides:
All right, title, and interest in property (subject to forfeiture) vests in the United
States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section.
Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the
defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall
be ordered forfeited to the United States ....
Id.
87. The taint theory has long been recognized as applicable in civil forfeiture cases. See
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 685, reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977
(1974); United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890); Simons v. United States, 541 F.2d 1351,
1352 (9th Cir. 1976); Florida Dealers & Growers Bank v. United States, 279 F.2d 673 (5th Cir.
1960); Wingo v. United States, 266 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1959); Weathersbee v. United States, 263
F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1958). Subsequent to the 1984 amendment of the RICO forfeiture provisions,
the Seventh Circuit reached this same result in United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798 (7th
Cir. 1985), where it held:
[Wihile the government's interest in the profits or proceeds of racketeering activity
does not attach until conviction, its interest vests at the time of the act that
constitutes the section 1962 violation and cannot subsequently be defeated, as far
as section 1963(a)(1) is concerned, if the defendant dissipates or transfers away the
proceeds subject to forfeiture.
Id. at 801 (emphasis in original). See also United States v. Navarro-Ordas, 770 F.2d 959, 970
(IIth Cir. 1985) (to carry out congressional intent behind RICO forfeiture provisions, court
must order forfeiture of amount of profits from racketeering activity and place burden of
satisfying order on convicted defendant), reh'g denied en banc, 776 F.2d 1057 (1985); United
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provided a hearing procedure to protect third parties who had made bona
fide purchases of the defendant's property subsequent to the act giving rise
to forfeiture. 81
A final major congressional revision to the RICO forfeiture provisions
was the inclusion of an ancillary hearing procedure. This hearing is to be
utilized for the resolution of third party claims arising out of the RICO
forfeiture action in the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984.89 Section
1963(m) provides for a post-judgment hearing to be held upon application
by a third-party claimant. 90 At this hearing, third-party claimants may establish
a legal basis for relief by proving that they either had a legal interest in the
property prior to the commission of the criminal offense,91 or that they were
bona fide purchasers for value and did not have reason to believe that the
property was subject to forfeiture. 92 A third party who is unable to establish
States v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566, 577 (l1th Cir. 1985) (upholding taint theory to reach other
assets of defendant, where defendant had dissipated assets identifiable to criminal enterprise
prior to conviction), cert. denied sub nom. Taylor v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 72 (1985).
88. The Senate Judiciary Committee, in reference to this section, stated, "[Slection 1963(c),
as amended by the bill, makes it clear that this provision may not result in the forfeiture of
property acquired by an innocent bona fide purchaser. Such purchasers are entitled to relief
under the new ancillary hearing procedure in section 1963(m) which was adopted by amendment
by the Committee." For a discussion of the hearing procedures of § 1963(m), see SENATE
REPORT, supra note 73, at 201. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text. In a recent case,
United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1985), the court held that a similar pre-
conviction restraining order provision added by Congress to the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that because Congress
failed to provide for a hearing on a restraining order before trial or conviction, the provisions
violated third parties' fifth amendment rights to due process of law. Id. at 1383.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1984).
90. Id. § 1963(m)(2). This section provides:
Any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in property which
has been ordered forfeited to the United States pursuant to this section may, within
thirty days of the final publication of notice or his receipt of notice under paragraph
(1), whichever is earlier, petition the court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity
of his alleged interest in the property. The hearing shall be held before the court
alone, without a jury.
Prior to the enactment of this ancillary hearing procedure, the Department of Justice had taken
the position that, at least in the first instance, any third party asserting a legal or equitable
basis for relief should petition the Attorney General for remission or mitigation of the forfeiture.
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 207.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(6)(A) (1984). The Senate Judiciary Committee stated with regard
to this test, "[The petitioner will prevail where he] had a legal interest in the property that, at
the time of the commission of the acts giving rise to the forfeiture was vested in him rather
than the defendant or was superior to the interest of the defendant." SENATE REPORT, supra
note 73, at 209.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(6)(B) (1984). The Senate Judiciary Committee stated, "[The
petitioner will prevail where he] acquired his legal interest after the acts giving rise to the
forfeiture but did so in the context of a bona fide purchase for value and had no reason to
believe that the property was subject to forfeiture." SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 209.
The Committee further indicated that this provision should be construed to deny relief to third
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a legal basis for relief may still seek equitable relief by petitioning the
Attorney General.93
In sum, the amendments made by the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of
1984 to the RICO forfeiture provisions have enhanced the attractiveness of
these provisions to federal law enforcement agencies. Given a literal reading,
the RICO provisions allow for the forfeiture of both the direct and derivative
proceeds of the RICO criminal activity for which the defendant has been
convicted. 9' Additionally, the government is no longer constrained from
protecting its interest in forfeitable property prior to the defendant's con-
viction. The government may now seek both pre-indictment and pre-convic-
tion restraining orders to prevent defendants from attempting to defeat
forfeiture by transferring their property prior to trial. 9 The ability of the
defendant to transfer assets prior to trial has also been significantly reduced
due to the inclusion of "relation back" provisions. These provisions provide
that title to the proceeds of the criminal activity is deemed to vest in the
government upon commission of the criminal act, rather than upon the
defendant's conviction. 6 Finally, the government's forfeiture claim of the
proceeds from criminal activity is now superior to the claims of all third
parties, unless the third party can establish that they had an interest in the
property prior to the commission of the criminal act or that they were a
bona fide purchaser for value. 97
II. THE APPLICATION OF THE RICO FoRFEmRup PROVISIONS TO
ATTORNiEYs' FEES
In recent years, federal law enforcement agencies have proceeded on the
theory that organized crime in this country flourishes not only because of
its tremendous economic power, but also because of the efforts of attorneys
who assist these organizations in the pursuit of their criminal activities. 98
Accordingly, prior to the amendment of the RICO forfeiture provisions in
1984, law enforcement agencies were willing to include lawyers within the
parties acting as nominees of the defendant or who have knowingly engaged in sham or
fraudulent transactions. Id. at 209 n.47.
93. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 209. The Senate Judiciary Committee added,
however, that the Attorney General's decision on this petition should not be subject to judicial
review as it was under prior law. See supra note 66.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1984). See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1984). See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c)(e) (1984). See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
97. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1984). See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., McDaniel, Mob Defenders: As Corrupt As Their Clients? 71 A.B.A. J. 32,
32-33 (1985) (renegade attorneys have become integral parts of criminal conspiracies, using their
status as sworn officers of court to advance purpose of criminal organizations); Taylor, Lawyers
Called Organized Crime Life Support, N.Y.L.J., March 11, 1985, at I, col. 2 (discussing staff
report of President's Commission on Organized Crime that asserted that small group of lawyers
have become critical element in life support system of organized crime).
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scope of their investigative and prosecutorial efforts. 99 Since the enactment
of the amendments to the RICO forfeiture provisions, prosecutors have
expanded their efforts against attorneys by attempting to apply the RICO
forfeiture provisions to the fees paid by RICO defendants to their counsel. 1°°
The RICO forfeiture provisions do not explicitly state whether attorneys'
fees are forfeitable. Section 1963(c) merely provides that any forfeitable
property transferred to a third party continues to be subject to forfeiture,
unless the third party prevails in the post-conviction hearing provided by
section 1963(m). 101 Section 1963(m) is also silent on its applicability to
attorneys' fees. This section merely indicates that the property transferred
to the third party is subject to forfeiture unless that party establishes a prior
interest in the property or shows that they are a bona fide purchaser for
value who had no reason to believe that the property was subject to for-
feiture. 102
In the absence of clear statutory language, courts faced with the question
of attorneys' fees have turned to the legislative history of the forfeiture
provisions for guidance. 3 The legislative history of section 1963(m) is devoid
of any specific reference as to whether attorneys' fees are forfeitable. How-
ever, the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee discusses what property
is subject to a forfeiture order. In particular, the Senate Judiciary Committee
report states, "an order of forfeiture may reach only property of the
defendant, save in those instances where a transfer to a third party is
voidable."'14 The legislative history further indicates that the statute is not
99. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984) (federal grand jury
subpoena issued to attorneys for fee information about clients whom they were representing in
pending state criminal prosecution); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032
(2d Cir. 1984) (subpoena of law firm's client records); Klitzman, Klitzman & Gallagher v. Krut,
744 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1984) (seizure of law firm's records); U.S. v. $149,345 U.S. Currency,
747 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1984) (forfeiture of attorneys' fees upheld where attorney refused to
disclose identity of his client).
100. See United States v. lanniello, 621 F. Supp. 1455 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (United States
Attorney asserted that attorneys' fees were subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963); United
States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (government served subpoena duces
tecum on attorney for fee information, asserting it would be relevant evidence of offense with
which defendant was charged and that fees would be forfeitable under § 1963); Payden v.
United States, 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.
1985) (defendant's counsel served with subpoena duces tecum requiring him to appear before
grand jury and disclose information regarding fee arrangement); United States v. Rogers, 602
F. Supp. 1332 (D.C. Colo. 1985) (defendant sought order declaring that fees of his attorney
would not be subject to forfeiture under § 1963).
101. See supra note 88.
102. See supra notes 91-92.
103. United States v. lanniello, 621 F. Supp. 1455, 1476 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v.
Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Payden v. United States, 605 F. Supp.
839, 849-50 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985); United States
v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1346-47 (D.C. Colo. 1985).
104. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 208.
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designed to reach legitimate transfers for value to third parties, and that
voidable transfers, as contemplated by the statute, are those that the defend-
ant has made pursuant to some type of sham or artifice. 05
In United States v. Rogers,06 a federal district court specifically relied
upon the legislative history behind section 1963(m) in concluding that the
RICO forfeiture provisions are inapplicable to attorneys' fees. The Rogers
court recognized that section 1963(m) imposes a two-prong test on a third
party attempting to prevail in a post-conviction ancillary hearing. The court
concluded that attorneys, who receive fees for services rendered, meet the
first prong of this test, because they have paid value. 0 7 The court recognized
that it must apply the canon of statutory construction that Congress was
aware of, and adopted, existing case law when it drafted a particular
statute. 08 Since prior case law held that the filing of the indictment was
sufficient notice to a third party of the government's claim for forfeiture,
the court held that a defendant's attorney could never be a taker without
notice. 09 The Rogers court, after noting that the statute itself was silent on
whether attorneys' fees are forfeitable, looked to the legislative history." 0
The court determined that, because an attorney who receives funds for bona
fide services rendered engages in neither a fraud nor a sham, fees paid to
the attorney are not within the reach of the RICO forfeiture statute."'
105. Id. at 209 n.47.
106. 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
107. Id. at 1346.
108. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-99 (1979) (unless Congress specified
to contrary, it intended to adopt existing case law). Prior to the 1984 amendments to the RICO
forfeiture provisions, case law held that knowledge of the indictment and the government's
claim to forfeiture therein was sufficient notice to a third party attorney. See United States v.
Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476, 478 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984); United States
v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 917 (3d Cir. 1981).
109. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1347.
110. The Rogers court reasoned that:
An attorney who receives funds in return for services legitimately rendered, operates
at arm's length and not as part of an artifice or sham to avoid forfeiture. Like the
grocer compensated for the food he sells the defendant or the doctor paid a fee
for healing the defendant's children, the lawyer is entitled to compensation for his
services actually and legitimately rendered.
Id. at 1348. Not surprisingly, the Justice Department has a different interpretation of Congress's
intent. The Justice Department argues that Congress specifically rejected the notion that
attorneys' fees are exempt from forfeiture by citing with approval United States v. Long, 654
F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981). In Long, the court ruled that property derived from a violation of 21
U.S.C. § 848 was still subject to forfeiture although transferred to the defendant's attorneys
more than six months prior to conviction. See Justice Department Guidelines on Forfeiture of
Attorneys' Fees, CiuM. L. REP., Sept. 18, 1985, at 3001 (BNA) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines].
I 11. While the Rogers court concluded that Congress did not intend to include in those items
forfeitable the compensation already paid for goods and services legitimately provided, it
recognized that assets transferred to a lawyer as part of a sham would be subject to forfeiture.
602 F. Supp. at 1348.
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Other courts, however, have not reached the same result as the Rogers
court. In United States v. Payden, 2 the court read the Report of the Senate
Judiciary Committee to require that both prongs of the two-prong test of
section 1963(m) be met before a third party will prevail.1 3 Thus, under
Payden, because the filing of the indictment constitutes notice that the
defendant's assets are subject to forfeiture, attorneys who had received their
fees could not be said to have entered into an arms-length transaction
regardless of the price paid for their services. 114
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT PROBLEMS IN APPLYING RICO FORFEITURE
PROVISIONS TO ATTORNEYS' FEES
The Court's analysis in Payden is unsound because it will interfere with
a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel in any RICO case where
forfeiture of attorneys' fees is sought in the indictment. A cornerstone of
our criminal justice system is the right of the accused to be represented by
competent counsel. The colonists considered this right to be fundamental
even before the adoption of the federal Constitution and the Bill of Rights." 5
In the 1932 case of Powell v. Alabama,"6 the Supreme Court first established
the right of an indigent defendant to appointed counsel in all federal capital
cases." 7 Later, in United States v. Wade,"' the Supreme Court gave an
112. 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
113. Id. at 849 n.14.
114. The Payden court argued:
[Flees paid to attorneys cannot become a safe harbor from forfeiture of the profits
of illegal enterprises. In the same manner that a defendant cannot obtain a Rolls-
Royce with the fruits of a crime, he cannot be permitted to obtain the services of
the Rolls-Royce of attorneys from these same tainted funds .. . [T]o permit this
would undermine the purpose of forfeiture statutes, which is to strip offenders and
organizations of their economic power.
Id. The Justice Department has recently approved of the Payden court's reasoning. See
Guidelines, supra note 110, at 3003.
115. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968, 972 (2d Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 781 F.2d 238 (2d. Cir. 1985). In colonial England, parties in civil cases, persons
accused of misdemeanors, and those charged with treason were entitled to the full assistance
of counsel. Those charged with felonies, however, were denied the aid of counsel, except with
respect to legal questions that the accused might suggest. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60
(1932). At the time the Constitution was adopted, this common law rule had been rejected in
at least twelve of the thirteen colonies. Id. at 64. Thus, in enacting the Constitution, the
framer's included language providing that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
116. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
117. While an accused defendant was viewed as having the right to assistance of counsel
under the Constitution, the government was not perceived to be liable to provide counsel to
those unable to retain their own. See Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel on Appeal: Due
Process Prevails in Evitts v. Lucey, 35 DE PAUL L. REy. 185, 186-87 & nn.8-12 (1985). In
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), however, the Supreme Court recognized that this right
"is of such a character that it cannot be denied without updating those fundamental principles
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expansive reading to the sixth amendment's guarantee of counsel when it
held that the amendment required counsel's assistance whenever necessary
to assure a meaningful defense."1 9 More recent Supreme Court cases have
confirmed that a person is entitled to be represented by an attorney at or
after the time judicial proceedings have been initiated against them, "whether
by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or
arraignment."120
Courts have also recognized that defendants able to retain counsel have a
qualified right to obtain counsel of their own choice. 121 It is unnecessary to
reach the question of whether a defendant's right to obtain counsel of their
own choice has been infringed by the Payden decision. The practical effect
of Payden is not that defendants will be denied counsel of their own choice,
but rather, defendants may be unable to retain counsel at all. 22
An indigent defendant who is unable to afford the retention of counsel
has a right to obtain appointed counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A). Never-
theless, this option is not available to a RICO defendant who has money to
of liberty and justice which lie at the bases of all our civil and political institutions." Id. at 67
(quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
118. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
119. Id. at 225. See also United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1149 (2d Cir. 1980) (right
to obtain assistance of counsel at all crucial stages is essential if both symbol and reality of
fair trial are to be preserved).
120. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 388 (1977) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
689 (1972)). The circuits have been unanimous in holding that the sixth amendment right to
counsel attaches once advisory judicial proceedings have been commenced. See, e.g., In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968, 972 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Howard, 752 F.2d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Muzychka, 725 F.2d 1061, 1069
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1206 (1984); United States v. Hansen, 701 F.2d 1215, 1220
(7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 845 (1983).
121. See United States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Flanagan,
679 F.2d 1072, 1075 (3d Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 465 U.S. 259 (1984); United States
v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979). See also
United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95, 106-07 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983);
United States v. La Monte, 684 F.2d 672, 673 (10th Cir. 1982); Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207,
209 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982). The Justice Department, however,
argues that defendants are only entitled to choose affordable counsel and cites United States
v. Rogers, 471 F. Supp. 847, 851 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion, United States v. Raife,
607 F.2d 1000 (2d Cir. 1979), in support of this proposition. See Guidelines, supra note 110,
at 3002. In addition, the Justice Department notes that several courts have held that a defendant
can be prevented from using assets which are subject to forfeiture to pay counsel of choice.
Id. See United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476, 478 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
837 (1984); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915-17 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Bello,
470 F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
122. As noted in Rogers, the payment of attorneys' fees is essential in retaining counsel, at
least in the circumstances of a RICO case. 602 F. Supp. at 1348; United States v. Badalamenti,
614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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pay counsel and who cannot, therefore, claim to be indigent.'23 The RICO
defendant's dilemma is not the inability to retain counsel due to indigence,
but rather the inability to find counsel willing to accept the risk that their
fee may later be subject to forfeiture. 24 Regardless of the possible availability
of appointed counsel to the RICO defendant, it may be argued that tradi-
tional views of due process and the right to counsel have been violated. 125
The Payden decision is unacceptable because it will inevitably deny defend-
ants their sixth amendment right to counsel once judicial proceedings have
been initiated against them. It is a fundamental principle of statutory inter-
pretation that when two interpretations of a statute exist, a court must
choose the interpretation that will render the statute constitutional.' 26 An
interpretation of the RICO forfeiture provisions that results in denying
defendants their sixth amendment right to counsel renders these provisions
unconstitutional. 27 Congress has recognized that the forfeiture provisions
must not interfere with constitutional rights by providing in the legislative
history of the in personam forfeiture provisions of the Comprehensive Drug
Penalty Act of 1984 that, "[N]othing in this section is intended to interfere
123. The Criminal Justice Act provides for the furnishing of representation to a person
"financially unable to obtain adequate representation." 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A) (1982).
124. United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Defendants with
money available to pay an attorney, albeit money that may eventually be subject to forfeiture,
could not lawfully swear under oath that they were financially unable to obtain counsel as
required by this Act. As a result, RICO defendants, unlike indigent defendants, would be placed
in a situation of being unable to obtain counsel, either retained or appointed. Id.
125. Practically, the costs of mounting a defense to an indictment under RICO are far
beyond the resources or expertise of the average federal public defender's office, which is
already overtaxed. The government brings to bear significant resources to prosecute RICO
cases. Adequate defense of RICO cases generally requires representation during grand jury
investigations lasting as long as two or three years. Counsel appointed three to four months in
advance of the defendant's trial is patently inadequate to protect the defendant's interests.
Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349-50. In reality, the fact that appointed counsel is available pays
no more than lip service to due process and the right to counsel. Id. at 1349.
126. As Justice Brandeis recognized in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288
(1936), "When the validity of an act of Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the qilestion may be avoided."
Id. at 483-84 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 66 (1921)).
127. United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). See, e.g., United
States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45 (1953) (court's duty to avoid constitutional issue applies not
merely to legislation, but also to congressional action by way of resolution); Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (it is cardinal principle of statutory construction that if serious doubt
of constitutionality is raised, Court will first ascertain whether construction of statute is fairly
possible by which question may be avoided); Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U.S. 573, 577 (1929)
(what Congress has written must be construed with eye to possible constitutional limitations so
as to avoid doubts as to validity); Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S.
331, 346 (1928) (it is court's duty in interpretation of federal statiltes to reach conclusion that
will avoid serious doubt of constitutionality). See also 2A SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 45.11
(4th ed. 1984).
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with a person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel."'' 21 Courts confronted
with this issue have recognized the legislative history as a positive statement
of congressional intent. 29
IV. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE PROBLEMS IN APPLYING RICO
FORFEITURE PROVISIONS TO ATTORNEYS' FEES
The application of the RICO forfeiture provisions to attorneys' fees paid
by a defendant presents difficult problems with regard to the attorney-client
privilege. As a general rule, information relating to the fees of an attorney
is not privileged.3 0 The information which an attorney would need to disclose
in order to prevail at a section 1963(m) hearing, however, would necessarily
include more than merely the rates and hours expended. It would require
disclosure of the attorney's knowledge as to both the scope and source of
the defendant's assets.' 3 ' Such disclosure far exceeds the limited exception
to the attorney-client privilege providing for information relating to attor-
neys' fees.1 2
The general rule that information pertaining to attorneys' fees is not
privileged is subject to exception where the disclosure would implicate the
128. Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary concerning the Comprehensive Drug
Penalty Act of 1984, H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 n.1. (1984) (part I).
129. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1347-48 n.4; United States v. lanniello, 621 F. Supp. 1455,
1476 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
While the House Judiciary Committee's discussion of the right to counsel dealt with the problem
of pre-trial restraining orders, the Rogers court felt that this analysis was equally applicable to
the problem of chilling the pre-trial availability of counsel due to the threats of post-conviction
forfeiture. Rogers, 602 F. Supp at 1347-48 n.4. But see United States v. Payden, 605 F. Supp.
839 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985) (court felt that reliance on
report in Rogers was misplaced). According to Payden, Congress did not intend to resolve the
sixth amendment conflict through legislation, but rather left the resolution of these issues to
the courts. Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 850-51 n.14. See supra note I10.
130. United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir. 1974) (generally attorney-
client privilege extends to substance of matters communicated to attorney in professional
confidence, not to matters related to receipt of fees from client); United States v. Ponder, 475
F.2d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1973) (matters involving receipt of fees from client normally not privileged);
Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637-38 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963)
(matters related to fees from client not usually privileged as they are not communicated to
attorney in professional confidence). But see Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir.
1961) (information may come within ambit of privilege when client's name itself has independent
significance such that disclosure would uncover client confidences).
131. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349.
132. Id. The Rogers court reasoned that while fee information may not be within the scope
of the attorney-client privilege because it is not a matter of substance communicated to the
attorney in professional confidence, the scope and source of the defendant's assets is a matter
of substance disclosed in professional confidence. Therefore, to require such disclosure would
violate the attorney-client privilege. Id. This reasoning is somewhat undermined by the legal
profession's recognition that lawyers may reveal the confidences and secrets of their clients
when necessary to establish or collect their fee. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 4-101(c)(4) (1981).
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client in a crime.'33 Because the disclosure required of attorneys opposing
forfeiture of their fees would occur in a post-conviction hearing, such
disclosures could not affect the determination of the defendant's guilt already
entered by the trial court. This disclosure, however, could affect the ultimate
determination of the defendant's guilt if an appeal were taken by the
defendant and the section 1963(m) hearing were held during the pendency
of this appeal. In this instance, attorney disclosure of privileged information
tending to incriminate the client may affect the ultimate determination of
the defendant's guilt because the finality of the determination is still pend-
ing. 134
The potential of disclosure of privileged information by the attorney
significantly impacts the attorney-client relationship. The purpose of the
attorney-client privilege is to promote full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients, thereby promoting broader public interests in the
observance of the law and administration of justice.' 35 The privilege recog-
nizes that sound legal advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer being
fully informed by the client. 36 However, if defendants know that information
disclosed to an attorney in confidence may later have to be disclosed by the
attorney in a section 1963(m) hearing, the willingness of defendants to provide
full and open disclosure to the attorney will be hampered. Therefore, the
mere threat of attorneys having to disclose privileged information may chill
the openness of attorney-client communications, thereby impinging upon the
defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. 137
133. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1083 (1981). See also United States v. Ponder, 475 F.2d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1973) (matters involving
receipt of fees from client, while normally not privileged, may be so if disclosure would implicate
client in crime).
134. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349.
135. CFTC v. Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. 1986 (1985); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 389 (1981); United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 1978).
136. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). In Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980), the Supreme Court recognized that the attorney-client privilege rests
on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for
seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out. Similarly, in Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976), the Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of the
privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys. The Court has long
recognized that full, free and open communication between attorney and client is the rationale
supporting this privilege. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (privilege is founded
upon necessity, in interest and administration of justice, of aid of persons having knowledge
of law and skilled in its practice, which can only be safely and readily availed of when client
is free from consequences or apprehension of disclosure).
137. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349. One commentator has suggested that if the client's
privilege of confidentiality is jeopardized by their retention of counsel and subsequent intercourse
with that counsel, they may be dissuaded from retaining counsel in basic opposition to their
right to counsel. See Seidelson, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Client's Constitutional Rights,
6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 713 (1978).
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V. ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN APPLYING RICO FORFEITURE PROVISIONS TO
ATTORNEYS' FEES
Application of the RICO forfeiture provisions to attorneys' fees presents
a number of potential problems under the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. For example, if the fees of an attorney representing a RICO
defendant are forfeitable, the attorney may be considered as having accepted
a contingent fee in a criminal case. Essentially, attorneys would only be
ensured of receiving their fee if the defendant were acquitted.' Also, a
potential conflict arises because attorneys may be more interested in pre-
serving the assets from which their fees could be paid. 39 Such actions may
result in a violation of the attorney's duty to give independent advice solely
for the benefit of their clients. 14
The application of RICO forfeiture provisions to attorneys' fees will add
more uncertainty to the already difficult ethical questions that an attorney
must face under the rules of conduct governing the legal profession. This
area of the law is already fraught with situations where the ethical, but
unwary, attorney may nevertheless be accused of wrongdoing. Moreover,
this application will needlessly inject additional distrust between the client
and his attorney. Such distrust will have a negative impact on the defense
attorney's efforts to effectively represent his client's interests.
VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The application of RICO forfeiture provisions to attorneys' fees has the
potential to undermine the principles underlying the adversary system. The
138. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(c) (1981). This Rule provides,
"A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee for
representing a defendant in a criminal case." See also Peyton v. Margiotti, 398 Pa. 86, 89-90,
156 A.2d 865, 867 (1959) (contingent fees, whether in civil or criminal case are special concern
of the law, but in criminal cases, rule is stricter because of danger of corrupting justice);
MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 52 (1964) (A Report of the American Bar
Foundation) (consensus among commentators is that contingent fee in criminal case is void as
against public policy).
139. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(A) (1981). This rule provides,
"A lawyer shall not acquire a property interest in the cause of action or subject matter of
litigation he is conducting for a client .... ; DR 5-101(A) provides, "[A] lawyer shall not
accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be
or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal interests."
See Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 849-50 n.14 (citing People v. Csabon, 103 Misc. 2d 1109, 1110,
427 N.Y.S.2d 571, 572 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (attorney who had agreed to pay fine for convicted
client was disqualified from arguing motion to reduce or vacate fine).
140. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A), 103(A) (1981).
See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (1981) (professional judgment
of attorneys should be exercised solely for benefit of their clients and free of compromising
influences and loyalties); EC 5-2 (lawyers should not accept employment that will adversely
affect advice to be given to their clients); EC 5-3 (lawyers should decline employment if their
interest in property may interfere with exercise of free judgment on behalf of their clients); EC
5-7 (possibility of adverse effect upon exercise of free judgment by lawyers on behalf of their
clients makes it undesirable for lawyers to become financially interested in outcome of litigation).
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United States Supreme Court has expressed its view that "the very premise
of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both
sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be
convicted and the innocent go free, ' 14' and that the "balance of forces
between the accused and his accuser" is central to due process. 42 If the
RICO forfeiture provisions are indeed applicable to attorneys' fees, prose-
cutors will maintain the tactical advantage of choosing their legal opponent
by selectively appending a RICO forfeiture indictment directed towards
attorneys' fees. This tactic permits prosecutors effectively to exclude skilled
defense attorneys. 43
While prosecutors are required to act in good faith, prosecutorial miscon-
duct can and does occur.'" The United States Justice Department has recently
acknowledged that attorneys representing criminal defendants, whose assets
may be subject to forfeiture, are in a unique position and that the prosecutor
should take this into consideration when applying the RICO forfeiture
provisions to attorneys' fees. 4 Accordingly, the Justice Department has
issued guidelines designed to assure that the application of the forfeiture
provisions to attorneys' fees will be carefully reviewed and fairly applied. 146
These guidelines, however, fail to represent any variance from the previous
Justice Department position that there are no constitutional or statutory
prohibitions to the application of the third party forfeiture provisions to
141. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975).
142. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973).
143. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1350.
144. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (defendant's due process rights violated by
prosecutor's suppression of evidence requested by defendant where evidence was favorable to
accused and material to either guilt or punishment); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959)
(defendant's due process rights violated by prosecutor's knowing failure to correct false testi-
mony relating to witness's credibility); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (defendant's
denied due process and fair trial by prosecutor's deliberate use of perjured testimony to obtain
conviction); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Kiefaber), 774 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1985) (grand jury
subpoenas properly quashed in face of federal prosecutor's flagrant attempts to circumvent rule
of grand jury secrecy); United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979) (indictment
dismissed because prosecutor misled jury to believe that witness was truthful when prosecutor
knew of witness's extensive history of drug abuse and doubtful credibility); United States v.
Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Colo. 1984) (dismissal of grand jury indictment due to
numerous acts of prosecutorial misconduct, including violations of federal criminal rules
pertaining to grand juries, violations of statutory witness immunity sections, violations of fifth
and sixth amendments, knowing presentation of misinformation to grand jury and mistreatment
of witnesses); United States v. Anderson, 577 F. Supp. 223 (D. Wyo. 1983) (indictment dismissed
due to government's misconduct in use of undercover investigations to infiltrate defense camp
and involvement of grand jury in that infiltration); United States v. Lawson, 502 F. Supp. 158
(D. Md. 1980) (indictment dismissed because of prosecutor's deliberately false and misleading
interrogation of defense witness).
145. See Guidelines, supra note 110, at 3003.
146. Id.
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attorneys' fees.' 47 Therefore, these guidelines are at best a cosmetic treatment
of a troubling area of the law. This trouble can be resolved through specific
congressional action. The alternative is the otherwise long and inevitable
battle that will ensue in the nation's court system as the Justice Department
selectively chooses cases in which to advance its views.
Currently, bills have been introduced in Congress which are aimed at
amending the RICO statute. 4s None of these bills, however, proposes any
change to the RICO forfeiture provisions. While the changes proposed by
these bills may be desirable, legislation is necessary to exempt the expenses
that defendants incur while awaiting a RICO forfeiture trial. In this way,
should a pre-conviction restraining order be entered by the court, defendants
will still have resources available to pay their mortgage, grocery bills, medical
bills and lawyer's fees.1 49 While such an amendment could have the effect
of permitting RICO defendants to enjoy the fruits of their criminal actions,
this enjoyment would be subject to a reasonableness limitation by the court.
Therefore, an amendment of this type would protect the government's
concern that criminal defendants should not enjoy the fruits of their crime,
while correcting the potential prosecutorial advantage created by the current
RICO forfeiture provisions.
CONCLUSION
The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act's amendments to the RICO forfeiture
provisions have provided federal law enforcement agencies with a powerful
weapon which may be utilized to attack the economic base of- organized
crime. The prosecutor's discretion under these provisions, however, is not
unbridled. When a prosecutor attempts to utilize the RICO forfeiture pro-
visions to reach the fees paid to a defendant's attorney in a bona fide
transaction for legal services performed, the government's interest in fighting
organized crime's economic base is outweighed by the defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel, the defense attorney's duty to abide by the
attorney-client privilege, and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
Due process requires a balancing of both the interests of the government
and the rights of the accused. The current RICO forfeiture provisions have
upset this balance by providing the prosecution with the opportunity to
147. Id. The insufficiency of these guidelines is also demonstrated by the fact that the
Department of Justice issued them with the qualification that they are solely for the purpose
of internal department guidance and may not be relied upon to create any rights nor place any
limitations on otherwise lawful litigative prerogatives of the department.
148. See S. 1521, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (sponsored by Senator Hatch); H.R. 2517,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (sponsored by Representative Conyers); H.R. 2943, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1985) (sponsored by Representative Boucher).
149. In Rogers, the court noted that while the representation provided by counsel may not,
in the common sense, be considered a "necessary" like food, shelter or health care, in other
legal contexts attorney fees are considered a necessary. 602 F. Supp. at 1348 n.5.
[Vol. 35:709
1986] RICO FORFEITURE 737
selectively remove an adversary, from the judicial process due to the risk that
the adversary's fee may later be found to be forfeitable. Congressional
amendment of the RICO forfeiture provisions is thus desirable, necessary
and appropriate.
Leigh Roadman

